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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis shows how the metaphysical features of the Jungian collective unconscious 
can be demystified by viewing the collective unconscious through the lens of functionalism. The 
features of the collective unconscious that will be investigated in this thesis are the possibility of 
the collective unconscious being present in every person, the archetypes as being the formal 
feature of some of our modes of perception, psychic energy, and synchronicity. By admitting 
functionalism, Jung doesn’t need to posit synchronicity to explain how it is possible for the 
archetypes to interact with the body. This is because functionalism can view mental states as 
being material without needing another connecting principle, i.e., synchronicity, which goes 
beyond scientific explanation. If mental states are material and the body is a material thing, there 
is no need for Jung to explain how the archetypes interact with the body through synchronicity. 
In viewing the collective unconscious as a functional system, synchronicity can be dismissed 
while still leaving the rest of Jung’s psychological theory of the mind in place.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The collective unconscious, archetypes, primordial images, and psychic energy are 
concepts which have been received with skepticism ever since their first appearance in the works 
of one of the most controversial figures in psychology: Carl Jung. His unorthodox approach to 
psychology lead Jung to formulate some of the most revolutionary concepts in psychotherapy, 
which have contributed to philosophy, religious studies, anthropology, and other fields. His 
empirical work has been the focal point for numerous critiques, with charges of obscurantism 
and spiritualism.  The main focus for claims of spiritualism and obscurantism reside with one of 
his least understood and highly-disputed contributions, the theory of the collective unconscious. 
The collective unconscious has been controversial within the field of psychology ever since its 
introduction. The reasons behind some of these disputes are due to the obscurity with which Jung 
presents his theories. According to Jung, the claims can only be so clear, because of the 
‘irrepresentable’ contents of the mind which Jung is trying to describe. This has led a few 
scholars to wrongly conclude that Jung is just another spiritualist who wants to resurrect 
something like the Platonic Forms in all their original glory (Mills, 2013). In this thesis, I will 
show that the four claims which have led to Jung’s collective unconscious as being called 
mystical are either unfounded or do not threaten the entirety of his theory. The four claims which 
make it seem like Jung is being mystical are the mental structures which make up the collective 
unconscious being present in everyone across time, the possibility of inherited structures which 
give images in the mind their shape, psychic energy,  and synchronicity. One of the main goals 
of this thesis, then, is to show that these claims hold no water when viewing Jung’s collective 
unconscious as a cognitive system that is defined based on its function, i.e., the inputs and 
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outputs and their causal relationship to each other. By appealing to functionalism, a metaphysical 
theory of the mind, Jung doesn’t need to postulate an extra-sensory phenomenon (synchronicity) 
to explain how the mind and body interact. This is because functionalism doesn’t make claims 
about the material make-up of mental contents but views them as being composed of a variety of 
properties maintaining a shared function, e.g., a spoon can be made from wood or tin. If the 
mind, then, has the same material properties as the body there is no need to go as far as Jung 
does to explain the features of the collective unconscious. 
  The defense in this thesis relies heavily on concepts that are the foundations of Jung’s 
theory of mind, namely, the collective unconscious and archetypes. To understand my defense, I 
will provide a brief introduction to the core features of the Jungian theory. The mind, for Jung, is 
broken into two categories; consciousness and unconsciousness. The first of these categories is 
perceptual awareness.  For example, I am able to call upon memories of the names of my closest 
friends, family, and acquaintances. They are in my conscious field of awareness and I have ready 
accesses to this sort of information. These components of the mind which fall under perceptual 
awareness is considered consciousness. The second category, unconsciousness, is the opposite of 
consciousness. It is everything that we are not  momentarily aware of in the mind. For example, 
sometimes when we forget a loved one’s birthday that information has temporarily lost its 
vitality, it has crossed the boundary of consciousness into the unconscious. It would take a gentle 
reminder or looking for past clues to restore the memory.  
The contents of the mind can fall into two categories for Jung. Those which have been 
obtained from personal experience and those contents which have not been obtained from 
personal experience. The two examples given above belong to the category of contents in the 
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mind which have been personally acquired from experience. Within this group are consciousness 
and the personal unconscious. The personal unconscious is “comprised of all the acquisitions of 
personal life, everything forgotten, repressed, subliminally perceived, thought, felt” (CW 6,  ¶ 
841. When you forgot the material that you studied for a test  it isn’t as if you never encountered 
the material before, but the material just lost its impression and became a part of the personal 
unconscious. The second category is content that is not acquired through personal experience but 
come from structures in the mind which are passed down through heredity. This is not to say that 
you inherit ideas or memories from dead relatives, but you inherit the cognitive structures that 
your early on ancestors also had. These similar cognitive structures are what Jung calls the 
collective unconscious.  
It is difficult to give a precise description of what the collective unconscious consists of 
because the contents cannot be directly observed by consciousness. The collective unconscious 
and its components can only be confirmed by empirical evidence from case studies in 
psychology, research in mythology and anthropology, and philosophy. Another reason for the 
lack of precision with what the collective unconscious is has to do with the development of 
Jung’s work overtime. Throughout his career, Jung has altered his conception of what the 
components of the collective unconscious are and the roles they play in the mind. Along with 
this development, the metaphorical language Jung uses to describe the collective unconscious 
and the archetypes also adds to the complexity in formulating a proper definition. In some of 
Jung’s early on works, he treats the archetypes and instincts as the same structure in the 
collective unconscious. In his later on works, he treats them as two separate structures. In this 
thesis, I will do what Jung does in his later on work and treat the archetypes and the instincts as 
4 
 
two distinct processes. By treating the archetypes and instincts as distinct structures will allow 
for a better understanding of Jung’s mental theory. Not only this, the later Jung thought that it 
would be best to understand them as distinct but closely related structures of the collective 
unconscious. Regardless of these issues, I will present  what Jung means by these complex 
structures of the mind and show how the issues of spiritualism do not present an issue for the 
collective unconscious.  
The collective unconscious is comprised of archetypes and instincts. The archetypes and 
instincts can be compared to the Grand Canyon. The Colorado river about 20 million years ago 
ran through the Grand Canyon, before it was “Grand”. Then due to the Colorado Plateau shifting 
upwards the river began to cut deeper, forming the vast canyon we see today (Ribokas, 2009). 
Just like the river that’s been running through the Canyon for the estimated 20 million years, so 
humans’ frequent experiences e.g., seeing the sun rise and set, have canalized themselves into the 
human psyche in the form of archetypes and instincts. When a typical situation, like the sun 
rising and setting occur, the archetypes activate. When this activation occurs, fantasies and 
thoughts enter into consciousness. These outputs of the archetypes are what Jung calls archetypal 
images. What distinguishes an archetypal image from a regular thought or fantasy is that the 
thought or fantasy has a formal quality, i.e., the way in which the thought or fantasy is shaped, 
that cannot be associated with the person’s past.  An example of such an image would be the 
cross. The cross appears in many cultures throughout history in various shapes and colors. We 
recognize that it is a cross because it maintains a specific form. This is where some confusion 
emerges in attempting to understand what an archetypal image is. With the example of the cross, 
the variety of colors and sizes which make up the diversity of crosses found throughout cultures 
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is not determined by the archetype. What the archetype influences is how the cross is formed. 
We recognize a cross as a cross by certain characteristic qualities. Without these characteristic 
qualities a cross wouldn’t be a cross. The archetype is responsible for the abstract features of a 
cross, not the material properties which the cross instantiates.  
The apprehension of these typical situations by the contents of the collective unconscious 
lead not only to the creation of symbols like the cross but also to the spontaneous emergence of 
ideas and actions. This description of the collective unconscious and the role in which instincts 
and archetypes play in the production of ideas, symbols, and actions are just a simple example of 
how the Jungian collective unconscious operates. Of course, this description has led to many 
criticisms regarding the metaphysical claims that Jung implies or makes outright in sketching his 
theory, e.g., purporting a transcendent realm where divine interference occurs, claiming that we 
have shared modes of experiences because there is an underlying force which connects all minds, 
or that we inherit the memories from out ancestors.  
. The main criticism of spiritualism has to do with Jung’s theory on the mind-body 
interaction. Synchronicity, for Jung, is the solution to the problem of how the mind and body can 
interact when they are two different substances. Jung feels the need to describe how the 
archetypes interact with the body. His solution to this problem is synchronicity. The reason 
synchronicity has been accused of spiritualism is because it makes something essentially non-
physical cause physical events in ways that seem to require entirely new laws of nature.  
To give a crude explanation (to be expanded later), synchronicity occurs when an internal 
mental content shares a relationship with an external event which cannot be easily explained by 
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physical causality and is rather connected by their similar meaning. For example, dreaming of 
the number 756 and having a movie ticket print out the number 756. The proof for this 
relationship is lacking and has stained Jung’s reputation. The purpose of this thesis, then, is to 
explore and evaluate the metaphysical claims that Jung makes regarding the collective 
unconscious and show how these claims do not threaten the collective unconscious or the 
archetypes if we view them as just another functional system of the mind.   Some of the 
metaphysical claims that will be investigated in this thesis are 
 1.) The collectivity of the collective unconscious; 
 2.) The possibility of pre-existent contents within the mind namely, instincts and 
archetypes; 
3.) Psychic Energy; 
4.) Synchronicity 
The first two claims do not offer any difficulties for the way I propose to understand the 
collective unconscious. I will show how the collectivity of the collective unconscious and the 
pre-existent structures, instincts and archetypes, don’t face any new or original problems that 
other contemporary accepted theories which have similar characteristics face. The third claim 
that Jung makes seems mysterious given the contemporary use of the term psychic. There is a lot 
of association with the term psychic to refer to something supernatural, e.g., you go to a psychic 
if you want to know your future. What Jung means by psychic energy is just a metaphor to help 
describe the movement of objects in the mind. Psychic for Jung is just everything that is related 
to the mind. The fourth point does pose an issue for Jung. Jung posits a phenomenon which is 
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almost impossible, given technological limitations and available evidence, to prove. I will show, 
throughout this thesis, that three of the four features of the collective unconscious do not pose an 
issue to Jung’s overall psychodynamic theory. Yet, by viewing the collective unconscious as a 
functional system, a theory of the metaphysics of mind which states something is the essential 
kinds of things they do, I will demonstrate how Jung doesn’t need to talk about synchronicity the 
way he does because the mind-body interaction problem goes away.  
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DETAILED EXPOSITION OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS 
Despite being studied in a variety of fields such as the humanities and physics, Jung was 
first and foremost a psychiatrist. His aim was to not only to cure his patients from their 
psychological impairment but to also find purpose for the patient’s life through a process known 
as individuation.  
Individuation, according to Jung, is the process of self-actualization. In other terms, it is 
the process through which the person becomes aware of certain aspects of their personality 
which previously was unknown to them Jung uses “the term ‘individuation’ to denote the process 
by which a person becomes a psychological ‘in-dividual,’ that is, a separate, indivisible unity or 
‘whole.’” (CW 9i, ¶ 490). Jung thinks that there are aspects of a person’s personality which are 
not consciously accessible.  For Jung, the missing aspect which requires to be unified is the 
unconscious portion of a person’s personality. The individuation process is a natural process 
which occurs on its own, but as all natural processes can suffer from some sort of defect, e.g., 
heart failure, the individuation process can also cease to function properly. To fix the defect in an 
individual’s individuation process Jung came up with his psychotherapeutic method.  
Jung admits that the methods for treating his patients usually rely heavily on Freud’s 
theory. There are many similarities between Freud and Jung. They both posit a structure of the 
mind known, as the unconscious, which, is a structured group of mental states outside of 
conscious awareness. Additionally, they both also think that fantasies are a product of the 
unconscious mind. To study the unconscious, then, Freud and Jung thought it was necessary to 
study the fantasies that their patients produced. This lead both of them into the study of dreams 
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were fantasies are produced spontaneously. Freud takes an objective view on dreams, i.e., that the 
contents of a dream refer to objects in the world. Freud also believed that dreams disguised their 
meaning to prevent the dreamer from waking up. The reason a person may wake up was because 
Freud believed that some of the immoral contents of the unconscious would conflict with the 
person’s consciously-endorsed moral principles. Dreams, then, expressed for Freud unrealized 
infantile desires, e.g., the desire to marry your father. These incompatibilities could, in some 
cases, cause a disturbance known as a neurosis (CW7, ¶14)1. It is these infantile wishes that are 
the primary causes of dreams for Freud. When a person becomes aware of their infantile wishes 
there is a tendency for consciousness to deny their existence and repress them. There occur 
certain situations in a person’s life that reminds them of their infantile desires, and it conflicts 
with the persons current moral principles, then the situation is repressed, and neurotic symptoms 
begin to appear.  
The infantile wishes are usually sexual, and they represent a wish from the patient’s 
childhood past which would be unacceptable given the persons moral principles. Freud had 
observed in his patients that by talking about specific aspects of their dream they would 
unconsciously produce a string of ideas which causally lead back to infantile desires.  
Jung finds a few flaws in the Freudian theory. To begin with, Jung and Freud differ 
drastically on what dreams represent. Freud’s theory on dreams states that the dream 
intentionally hides the moral conflict of the dreamer to not disturb their sleep. This doesn’t hold 
 
1 “Neurosis is self-division. In most people the cause of the division is that the conscious mind 
wants to hang on to its moral ideal, while the unconscious strives after its- in the contemporary 
sense- unmoral ideal which the conscious mind tries to deny.” (CW7, ¶18) 
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too much weight for Jung, because dreams usually depict fantastic scenarios which are beyond 
the morals that a person may have when they are awake. For example, you may dream that 
you’ve murdered your mother without waking up. If Freud was correct, then dreams that are 
directly incompatible with your moral views should always wake you up, but they don’t. This 
either implies that Freud is wrong to assume that the infantile wishes are disagreeable to 
consciousness or that there is more than one cause of a dream. Freud’s theory that the cause of 
dreams are childhood experiences seems to be lacking and that there is something more to the 
creation of dreams than just childhood experiences (Freud, 1899).  For example, how could 
Freudian theory account for Neils Bohr’s dream of the structure of the atom (Weisskopf, 1984)? 
Or Einstein’s dream inspiring the discovery of his theory of relativity (Sweeny, 2014)?  You 
can’t explain the sudden revelation of an idea from personal infantile desires but instead require 
a deeper explanation that Freudian theory cannot support.  
 To resolve some of the issues with Freudian dream interpretation, Jung took a different 
approach.  Jung believed that dreams were a spontaneous biological product used as a 
compensatory mechanism to maintain mental stability. He believed that dreams did not disguise 
their meaning but thought that they revealed important information about the person at face 
value.  
Dreams are impartial, spontaneous products of the unconscious psyche, outside the 
control of the will. They are pure nature; they show us the unvarnished, natural truth, and are 
therefore fitted, as nothing else is, to give us back an attitude that accords with our basic human 
nature when our consciousness has strayed too far from its foundations and run into an impasse 
(CW 10, ¶ 317).  
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Much of the debate with Freud takes place with reference to dreams. Although I am not 
going to defend Jung’s or Freud’s method of dream interpretation, I will give a few examples of 
why the structures that Jung theorizes, the archetypes, are in the mind. This requires an 
explanation of some of Jung core ideas and theories which explain the efficacy of interpreting 
the contents of dreams. Dreams are the product of both the personal and the collective 
unconscious. The personal unconscious consists of experiences gained throughout one’s life; 
while the contents of the collective unconscious consists of cognitive structures which are 
inherited. These cognitive structures give a specific shape to our ideas, feelings, and thoughts, 
and are not to be confused with the theory that the ideas themselves  are inherited. To be clear, 
certain aspects of the contents which come from the collective unconscious can be recognized 
based on their similarities. The cognitive structures of the collective unconscious, then, give the 
framework to specific contents but do not reproduce them exactly as they appear in history. The 
cognitive structures which reside in the collective unconscious, then, are “inherited possibilities 
of human imagination as it was from time immemorable” (CW7, ¶101). Under Jung’s theory, 
aspects of a patient’s dream could be explained which Freud’s method could not account for. For 
example, the sudden appearance of something in a dream which also appears in a mythological 
narrative that the patient had no knowledge of, or the continuous repetition of a dream motif 
throughout history.  
The evidence that Jung produces for this view is vast, and he goes into a variety of 
material. To name a few are personal anecdotes, journals, mythological narratives, case studies, 
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literary texts, biographies.2 Also, many studies have shown the effectiveness of Jungian therapy. 
A review of an average of 90 Jungian therapeutic sessions across a six-year period showed that 
“Jungian treatment moves patients from a level of severe symptoms to a level where one can 
speak of psychological health” (Roesler, 2013).  
In what follows I will cite a few examples showing the widespread occurrence of an 
archetypal image throughout dreams from Jung’s patients, and images from different cultures. 
The first three dreams and images contain the symbol of the mandala, which for Jung is the 
archetype of wholeness. Mandal is the Sanskrit name for a circle (CW9i, ¶ 629). The mandala is 
a geometric pattern that represents, in religion, the universe. In some religions it represents the 
microcosm of the universe and a guide for realizing the “true” self.  A basic mandala is depicted 
as a circle inside of a square or a square inside of a circle like the two images shown below.  
 
Illustration 1 Circle Inside of a Square 
 
 
22 I refer the reader to Jung’s Symbols of Transformation for more information on the type of 
material that Jung used. 
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Illustration 2 Square Inside of a Circle 
 
 
 
The parallels between the meaning of the mandala in both China and India makes one 
assume that one developed from the other. But as Jung says 
[m]y late friend Richard Wilhelm, the eminent expert on classical Chinese philosophy, was of 
the opinion that no direct connections could be assumed. Nor, despite the fundamental 
similarities of the symbolic ideas, does there need to be any direct influence, since the ideas, as 
experience shows and as I think I have demonstrated arise autochthonously again and again, 
independently of one another, out of a psychic matric that seems to be ubiquitous. (CW9i, ¶ 643). 
 The first dream comes from a woman in the second half of her life.  
‘I was trying to decipher an embroidery pattern. My sister knew how. I asked her if she had made 
an elaborate hemstitched handkerchief. She said, “No, but I know how it was done.” Then I saw 
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it with the threads drawn, but the work not yet done. One must go around and around the square 
until near the centre, then go in circles’ (CW9i, ¶647). 
The second dream takes place in Liverpool with one of Jung’s male patients traveling 
friends. 
During this conversation we reached a sort of public garden in the middle of the city. The 
park was square, and in the centre was a lake or large pool. A few street lamps just lit up the 
pitch darkness, and I could see a little island in the pool. On it there was a single tree, a red-
flowering magnolia, which miraculously stood in everlasting sunshine. I noticed that my 
companions had not seen this miracle […] (CW9i, ¶654). 
The third dream I’ll mention comes from a ten-year-old girl. 
Once in a dream I was an animal that had lots of horns. It spiked up other little animals 
with them. It wriggled like a snake and that was how it lived. Then a blue fog came out of all the 
four corners, and it stopped eating. Then God came, but there were really four Gods in the four 
corners. Then the animal died, and all the animals it had eaten dame out alive again. (CW9i, 
¶623). 
The circle of the mandala in this last dream is the one God, while the square is the one 
God who is really four.  
To show the widespread occurrence of the mandala I will cite three different images. The 
first image is a sandpainting done by the Navaho Indians. 
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Illustration 3 Lodge of Dew 
 
The second image is the Tibetan mandala taken from the Sera Monastery  
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Illustration 4 TIbetan Mandala 
  
The third image is a mandala from Jakob Böhme XL Questions Concerning the Soule 
(1620) 
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Illustration 5 Jakob Bohme 1620 
 
The third image represents four aspects of the soul which are really the four corners of a 
square enclosing a circle.  The circle, in this image, shows the unity of two opposites, light and 
darkness, in the circle.  
 From the examples given above it becomes clear that the mandala symbol is not only 
spontaneously produced in the dreams of patients, but also occur throughout history in a 
disparate of cultures. The mandala symbol is only one of the many archetypes that Jung 
identifies in his collective works. It is now my task to describe what the archetypes are and how 
they function in the mind.  
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ARCHETYPES AND INSTINCTS  
 
ARCHETYPES 
As mentioned above, two central concepts for understanding the Jungian collective 
unconscious are archetypes and instincts.  In this section of the thesis I will exposit Jung’s 
account of archetypes and instincts in detail, describing their relation to the will and psychic 
energy.  
One of the difficulties when reading Jung is his understanding of the terms primordial 
image, archetype, and archetypal image.  Jung first used the term “primordial image” to 
designate both the archetype and the archetypal image. As time progressed, he realized he 
needed to draw a distinction between the images which are perceived in consciousness and the 
structures which give them their form. I will be referring to these structures as archetypes and 
their products as archetypal images. The archetypes are structures present from birth and are 
passed down to the next generation through biological reproduction. We can never be  directly 
aware of these structures because “the organ with which we might apprehend them-
consciousness- is not only itself a transformation of the original instinctual image, but also its 
transformer ( CW8, ¶399).” The only means of having access to these structures is through their 
products that appear in consciousness, the archetypal images . The archetypal images are images 
that appear in consciousness and motivate us to a specific action or way of thought.  
But what exactly does Jung mean by the term “images”? It is “a figure of fancy, or 
fantasy-image, which is related only indirectly to the perception of an external object” ( CW6, ¶ 
743).  The images appear abruptly in consciousness like a vision or a hallucination, but not as 
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vivid. The images are only internal and can be distinguished from external sensory perception 
except for rare cases, e.g., psychosis. The image “never takes the place of reality by the fact that 
it is an ‘inner’ image” (CW6, ¶743). For example, I see a distinct oak tree in the forest and on my 
way home I try to envision the tree in my mind. The image of the tree in my mind may not be as 
vivid and doesn’t evoke the same responses that the actual tree does, e.g., the rough feeling of its 
trunk, the smell, and so on, but it contains a specific form which makes me able to recognize that 
it was the oak tree I saw in the forest. For Jung, some images come from the unconscious, that is, 
forgotten memories, repressed ideas, and collective structures, i.e., instincts and archetypes.  
The inner image is a complex structure made up of the most varied material from the most varied 
sources. It is no conglomeration[…] but a homogeneous product with a meaning of its own […] 
It undoubtedly does express unconscious contents, but not the whole of them, only those that are 
momentarily constellated. (CW6, ¶ 745).  
There are two types of images. First,  personal images, which come from our memories 
and experiences and are not collective. And the second, archetypal image, which contain 
contents which are not personal but represent similar characteristics to mythological motifs. A 
quick example of an archetypal image comes from Jung’s observations of a schizophrenic 
patient: 
[H]e told me he could see an erect phallus on the sun. When he moved his head from side to side, 
he said, the sun’s phallus moved with it, and that was where the wind came from. This bizarre 
notion remained unintelligible to me for a long time, until I got to know the visions in the 
Mithraic liturgy (CW5, ¶ 151). 
In this pathological case,  the image is projected onto the sun. This symbol can be found in the 
Mithraic liturgy, part of the Greek Magical Papyri. The Cult of Mithras was a 1st to 4th century 
CE Roman mystery religion which focused on the god Mithras. In the Mithraic liturgy, the wind 
was said come from a tube hanging down from the sun. The publication of the work containing 
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this mythological symbol did not appear until after Jung’s observation with his patient. This 
means that the patient, not even possessing any higher education, was unlikely to have come 
across it. Because of the image did not belonging to any experiences that the person had, and it 
consists of mythological attributes, the image is an archetypal image.  
 The source of the archetype’s images are the archetypes. The archetypes are like 
blueprints which give the archetypal images their form. The archetypes are “a typical basic form, 
of certain ever recurring psychic experiences” (CW6, ¶ 748), e.g., growing old, having a child, 
losing a friend.  
 To elaborate further, the archetypal images which are forced into consciousness can vary 
in their form. They can be actual mental images depicting an actual or possible object or they can 
be auditory hallucinations.  The archetypal image is distinct from a regular mental image because 
they do not contain characteristics which are personal but are collective. This doesn’t mean that 
the idea is inherited, but the formatting elements, the archetypes, are inherited and are present as 
cognitive structures within most people. The archetypes do not contain anything from the 
person’s experience, unlike the archetypal images which when they emerge in consciousness are 
filled experiential content but remain archaic because of the characteristic form they have. This 
form indirectly supposes the existence of an archetype (CW6, ¶ 749). 
  These images, as Jung puts it, have a certain “dynamism.” This means that they are 
capable of motivating an individual into a particular state. Like instinctual reactions, the behavior 
which these images produce is impeded within the biological make-up of the archetype. It is 
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when a person perceives these images that they carry with them the capacity to motivate the 
person into a particular state of being which is related to the archetype which activated.  
INSTINCTS 
 Instincts are patterns of behavior in which we inherit from our early ancestors. They are 
collective, in the sense that they are found in most humans across a variety of cultures and can be 
recognized by the uniformity in reaction that is produced in a characteristic situation of an 
instinct, e.g., seeing a snake evokes shivering and screaming.  
 Jung distinguishes between phobias and instincts. The state of fear can have a variety of 
causes and effects ranging from being locked in a dark room to being scared of ducks because 
one bit you as a child. The latter case can be described as a fear being personally acquired 
through experience; in Jungian terms, a phobia. Phobias, being personally acquired, trigger 
symptoms characteristic of fear, e.g., anxiety, trembling, sweating, turning pale, etc.  The 
instincts, on the other hand, emerges in most cultures throughout history. Instincts, by contrast,  
are present at birth and develop with the subject.  
Instincts are impulses to act in a certain way not spurred by conscious. The instincts, like 
the archetypes, reside in the collective unconscious and activate when a certain situation is 
perceived. Jung says that 
[t]here are, in fact, no amorphous instincts, as every instinct bears in itself the pattern of its 
situation. Always It fulfills an image, and the image has fixed qualities. The instincts of the leaf-
cutting ant fulfills the image of ant, tree, leaf, cutting, transport, and the little ant-garden of fungi. 
If one of these conditions is lacking, the instinct does not function, because it cannot exist 
without its total pattern, without its image (CW8, ¶ 398). 
 The Jungian instincts are what biologists and psychologists typically think instincts are. 
They are modes of behavior which causes a person to react in a uniform way. An instinctual 
reaction usually takes place before the conscious perception of the action. For example, when 
you place your hand accidently on a burning stove you instinctively pull it away. Conscious 
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deliberation on whether the stove is hot is bypassed by the reflexive response caused by the 
instinct. The conscious awareness of the stove being hot usually doesn’t take place until after the 
action has been performed. It could also be argued that the conscious perception of the stove 
being hot, and the instinctual reaction take place at the same time. But either way, the example 
shows that the instinct is an unconscious reaction to a specific situation. 
THE ARCHETYPE-INSTINT RELATIONSHIP 
Now that an exposition of the archetypes and instincts have been given, an important 
question emerges: what is their relationship? Jung’s concept of the archetypes went through 
many distinct changes throughout his work. With these changes also came along different views 
about the relationship between the instincts and the archetypes. The view that I will defend  in 
this thesis is the interpretation that the archetypes and the instincts are two separate functions in 
the collective unconscious. At first, Jung speaks as if the archetypes regulated the instincts. This 
was his opinion in 1931 upon the publication of The Structure of the Psyche. He held that  
[t]he unconscious […] is the source of the instinctual forces of the psyche and of the forms or 
categories that regulate them, namely, the archetypes (CW8, ¶ 343). 
From this quote, Jung doesn’t make a clear distinction between the instincts and the archetypes, 
but rather views the archetypes as the controlling force which manages the instincts. Then, in his 
later writings in Instinct and the Unconscious (1948) Jung’s view shifted. 
In my view it is impossible to say which comes first-apprehension of the situation, or the impulse 
to act. It seems to me that both are aspects of the same vital activity, which we have to think of 
as two distinct processes simply for the purpose of better understanding. (CW8, ¶. 282) 
This version of Jung, he proposes that the instincts and the archetypes are part of the same 
process but for clarification purposes will treat them distinctly.  
His final view is reflected in On the Nature of the Psyche 1954. 
To the extent that the archetypes intervene in the shaping of conscious contents by regulating, 
modifying, and motivating them, they act like the instincts. It is therefore very natural to suppose 
that these factors are connected with the instincts and to inquire whether the typical situational 
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patterns which these collective form-principles apparently represent are not in the end identical 
with the instinctual patterns, namely, with the patterns of behavior. (CW 8, ¶ 404). 
Therefore, I will do in this thesis what Jung also does in his later on work; I will treat the 
archetypes and instincts as two separate processes which interact with one another. 
 The metaphorical language Jung uses to describe the relationship between the archetypes 
and instincts may leave the interpreter puzzled. The analogies he uses regarding the instincts and 
the archetypes, and the claim he made saying that there is no evidence to assume that the 
instincts and the archetypes are the same structure do help to clarify this relationship. Take the 
following 
[the instincts] have two aspects: on the one hand it is experienced as physiological 
dynamism, while on the other hand it is multitudinous forms enter into consciousness as images 
and groups of images, where they develop numinous effects which offer, or appear to offer, the 
strictest possible contrast to the instinct physiologically regarded… There is no point in deriving 
one from the other in order to give primacy to one of them. Even if we know only one at first, 
and  do not notice the other until much later, that does not prove that the other was not there the 
whole time (CW8, ¶ 414). 
 
 To elucidate this passage, Jung regards the instincts as being experienced 
“physiologically.” This is what our common concept of what an instinct is biologically: a  person 
sees a snake and they unconsciously scream or run away. That’s biomechanical. The archetype is 
what Jung calls the other aspect of the instinct which produces images in consciousness. But why 
does Jung refer to the instinct as being both a biological response and a production of images in 
consciousness? This make it seem that Jung is equating the instincts and the archetypes as the 
same process. This would contradict what he said earlier about the archetypes and instincts being 
two distinct processes. But this would be a misunderstanding of the claim that Jung makes in this 
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quote. Jung calls the archetypes the “formative principle of instinctual power” (CW 8, ¶ 416), 
which means that the archetypes transform the instincts into conscious images. Which motivates 
the person to fulfill the goal of the image. This isn’t to say that the archetypal image is the 
instinct or completely different than the instinct, or as Jung says in a metaphor the archetypal 
image is the “instinct raised to a higher frequency” (CW 8, ¶ 416). The higher frequency 
represents the archetypal image being conscious as compared to the unconscious instinct.  
Now a further question arises. What determines whether an archetype as opposed to an 
instinct will activate? Whether or not an archetype or an instinct will be activated depends on 
situation that the person is in and their disposition.  
Psychic processes[…] behave like a scale along which consciousness “slides.” At one moment it 
finds itself in the vicinity of instinct, and falls under its influence; at another, it slides along to the 
other end where spirit [(the archetype)] predominates. (CW8, ¶ 408) 
  Depending on whether or not an archetype or instinct activates depends on the 
disposition of the person. If the person views are underdeveloped, they will be driven by their 
instincts because their only goal is immediate gratification. If the person is in opposition to the 
instincts the archetypes will exhibit a large influence on the person and the result would be an 
intense spiritual commitment.  The second is the situation that the person is in. Now, depending 
on the disposition of the person the situation that they encounter will produce either an archetype 
an instinct or both.  
Take for example, a girl who is going for an early morning jog. As she is approaching an 
intersection, she feels the urge to abruptly stop. As she does so, a car runs a red light, barely 
missing her. If she kept going the car would have made an impact, injuring her, but her impulse 
to stop saved her life. The physical urge to stop can be seen as instinctual, it was her body which 
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reacted before she was able to process the situation. Now take the same situation, but this time 
imagine the girl running and she hears a voice telling her to stop. In this way, the situation that 
was sensed produced something psychological. Be it a voice telling her to stop, a hallucination, 
an image, this is the way the archetype manifests itself in these special situations, situations that 
may be new in the way they are expressed but resemble a typical experience that our ancestors 
would have undergone as well. What makes these two scenarios distinct is the way the archetype 
and instinct manifested in the situation. The image would be a way in which the archetype 
represents itself, while the unconscious response is the manifestation of the instinct.  
Will and Psychic Energy  
 There are two important features which need to be mentioned to complete a full 
description of the Jungian psyche. The first is Jung’s concept of will and the second is psychic 
energy.  
Within the psychic sphere the function [of instinctual aspect of the mind] can be deflected 
through action of the will and modified in a great variety of ways. This is possible because the 
system of instincts is not truly harmonious in composition and is exposed to numerous internal 
collisions. One instinct disturbs and displaces the other, and, although taken as a whole it is the 
instinct that makes individual life possible. (CW8, ¶ 378). 
By nature, the instincts have a particular compulsive character and respond when a typical 
situation is perceived. The aspect of the mind, which is not unconscious, has “lost its compulsive 
character, can be subjected to the will and even applied in a manner contrary to the original 
instinct” (CW8, ¶ 376). This reveals that the products of the instincts themselves are not 
complete dominants but exhibit a partial influence on our behavior. It is more the case that the 
archetypal images present an opportunity for the instinctual behavior to be transformed. A 
consequence of the interaction between the individual and the image is the discovery of 
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something new. It  is through these discoveries that the will is able to put that instinctual energy 
into productive use. For example, the meaning of what magnetic properties represented changed 
over time as we interacted more with the material. “The pre-Socratic philosopher Thales, for 
instance, argued that magnets demonstrated the “universal soul” of God in nature” (Kitch, 2018). 
But as we interacted with magnets more this view has changed from an association with God to 
an extremely useful material to be put to use.  
 Jung’s concept of psychic energy is just a term to help describe the movement of contents 
in the mind. It is nothing more than a concept used to describe the relationship between changes 
and is not something which is complimentary to physical energy as used by the physicist. The 
usage of psychic energy is a mere metaphor, like most of Jung’s metaphors, to grapple with the 
difficulty in understanding his theory of the collective unconscious. There is no evidence to 
assume that the mind uses something other than the energy found in the physical world.  For us 
to be aware of contents in consciousness, those contents need to possess a certain intensity in 
order to persist in consciousness. The contents which have high psychic energy are those which 
we are familiar with. For example, I am able to remember large portions of information about my 
friends and family so these contents contain a large amount of psychic energy and I can have 
ready access to them. Those contents which do not contain enough energy to cross the threshold 
of consciousness remain in the unconscious. The contents in the unconscious possess a certain 
amount of potential energy which has been either forgotten, repressed, or are archaic vestiges, 
e.g., instincts and archetypes. Certain situations release the potential energy that these contents 
contain. If they have a high enough activation energy they can enter into consciousness and 
displace certain contents, e.g., when a person sees a snake, they may lose their ability to think 
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rationally about a situation and instead uncontrollably scream or run away. The will has been 
temporarily displaced by the perception of the snake. 
 With the expansion of neuropsychology and cognitive psychology, it is most likely the 
case that the persistence of memory is due to the neural connections and how well formed these 
neural connections are. The archetypes and the instincts have their bases in the brain and because 
of this they interact through neural connections. In this way, then, psychic energy is nothing 
more than a metaphor in order to understand the relationship of the movement of contents within 
the mind without invoking the complicated neuroscience involved in order to account for the 
interaction of these structures.  
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INHERITANCE AND COLLECTIVITY 
Jung defines collective as “all psychic contents belong not to one individual but to many, 
i.e., to a society, a people, or to mankind in general” (CW6, ¶ 692). The collectivity of the 
collective unconscious refers to the features of structures within the psyche which are not 
personally acquired but are inherited. To put it more precisely, the collective unconscious is the 
layer within the human psyche which consists of the archetypes and instincts which are inherited 
from our ancestors. These structures result in at least some of the emotions, thoughts, and social 
structures we share. The collective unconscious contains cognitive categories which are the 
formative principle which causes the shared thinking and emotions depicted through 
mythological motifs found in a variety of cultures, e.g., worship of the sun or the anguish one 
feels when betrayed. These psychologically inherited structures may influence how we interpret 
reality; however, they do not completely determine human thought and action. In this section, I 
will show how the issue of collectivity in Jung’s theory are similar to other contemporary 
theories in cognitive psychology and evolutionary psychology which deal with .   
Jung’s collective unconscious is bound to inspire some critical remarks about its 
collective nature of the collective unconscious, that is, how can there be a part of the mind that 
produces images with features that are present in many cultures? This aspect of the mind gets 
enmeshed in the “nature v. nurture” debate. The collective unconscious, a piece of inherited 
human nature, is a sort of storage house, and thus, containing the imprints with the formative 
capability of producing psychological images or the capacity to evoke instinctual behaviors. 
These psychological images and instinctual behaviors are recognized by scientist by their form 
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or pattern that they take. The recognized occurrence of these forms and patterns has led many 
biologist and linguist to identify an inherited structure of the mind which is capable of producing 
these forms and patterns in civilizations and cultures throughout time.  
 In pathological cases, Jung noticed an abundance of fantasy images which resembled 
mythological symbols cross-culturally, which drove him to study symbology, anthropology, and 
comparative religion. From his study of these various fields, he concluded that there was a 
structure within the human mind with the capacity to automatically produce images which have 
their origin, not in personal acquisition, but in a universally shared structure, the collective 
unconscious. This theory is recognized as a possibility with the support of contemporary 
evolutionary psychology and the capacity to acquire language. 
In human genetics, the genome which has the ability to imprint genetic information 
allows for the development of the individual biologically, but it is also the case that genetics 
shape the way we develop psychologically. As with instincts being recognized as common 
patterns of behavior, it wouldn’t be too surprising to assume that there is also a structure within 
the human mind which shape mental images. This can best be seen in the widening acceptance of 
the inherited genetic origin of many pathological disorders. If the mind has certain capacities to 
develop these genetic disorders based off of inherited genes, it could very well be the case that 
we inherit other features along with the passed on pathological disorders. As Jung suggests, it 
seems very likely that we also inherit the formative ability to produce images which influence 
the way we behave, think, and act. It isn’t just Jung who came to this conclusion about inherited 
structures in mind, other fields in psychology have held similar observations.  
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  One of the main theories which exemplify this point is language acquisition. It had been 
thought that language was acquired by memorizing the rules of grammar and applying them. It 
wasn’t until Noam Chomsky proposed the theory of Universal Grammar that this supposition 
was challenged. In response to what Chomsky has called “Plato’s Problem,” which is how it was 
possible for a child who has never been educated to learn geometry, he suggested that language 
acquisition is innate and that the “ground plans” for acquiring grammar rules are present at birth 
in the individual (Chomsky, 1986).  
The language acquisition module represents the basic rules for the ability to acquire 
language. This device is embedded within the mind and gives the individual the capacity to learn 
the language. The Jungian collective unconscious has similar features to Universal Grammar 
theory’s representation of our language abilities that Chomsky presents. The archetypes have a 
specific form which can produce psychological contents within the human consciousness. As the 
language acquisition device contains the basic rules for structuring language in mind, the 
archetypes can also be viewed as rules for structuring specific psychological contents in the 
human mind as well. If there is the case that there is this structure which allows for language 
acquisition, it wouldn’t be too improbable for the collective unconscious also to be structured 
within the human mind capable of producing psychological contents with forms that are not 
acquired through the individual’s experience. 
Evolutionary psychology shows that there are other features within the mind which are 
not altogether learned, but (at least partially) innate. These structures are known as modules. 
These modules are domain specific, which to say that a cognitive structure is domain-specific 
means that [they are] dedicated to solving a restricted class of problems in a restricted domain. 
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For instance, the claim that there is a domain-specific cognitive structure for vision implies that 
there are mental structures which are brought into play in the domain of visual processing and 
are not recruited in dealing with other cognitive tasks (Samuels, 2000) 
According to the consensus in cognitive psychology, modules are innate. They are largely 
influenced by genetic outcomes, and the selection for these modules is motivated by the process 
of natural selection, and the final feature of these modules is that they are universally present in 
any normally functioning human being from birth (Samuels, 2000).  
The features of modules to which cognitive psychology are committed are similar to the 
properties that Jung ascribes to the archetypes and instincts in his theory on the collective 
unconscious. It seems that if the evolutionary psychologist can make claims about the 
collectivity of their innate structures called “modules” that the archetypes and instincts as well be 
viewed as a collective phenomenon that occurs in the human mind. 
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SYNCHRONICITY  
In Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle, Jung attempts to explain his most 
problematic and least understood concept: synchronicity. Jung comes up with the idea of 
synchronicity from a variety of sources, ranging from Lao-tzu’s philosophy on the Tao,  
Hippocrates and his concept of the sympathy of all things, and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz 
with his pre-established harmony (CW8, ¶ 957). These sources, though vast in their diversity, 
have similar features that form the bases of Jung idea on synchronicity, that is, the relationship 
between mind and the physical world. Due to the obscurity of the text and Jung’s uncertainty 
about the phenomenon he is investigating I will attempt to give as clear as possible an 
explanation of Jungian synchronicity.  
In Jung’s words, 
[t]he causality principle asserts that the connection between cause and effect is a necessary one. 
The synchronicity principle asserts that the terms of a meaningful coincidence are connected by 
simultaneity and meaning. (CW8, ¶. 916) 
To understand Jung theory, then, an elaboration of what constitutes a meaningful 
coincidence need to be explained including an explanation on why causality is inadequate and 
how synchronicity is a solution to the mind-body problem. 
    The most basic understanding of what he means by synchronicity is the occurrence of two or 
more events which have no seemingly causal connection but are connected because they have a  
similar meaning. Jung thinks that meaning is the value that the subject gives to the events that are 
taking place. He says that  
we must conclude that besides the connection between cause and effect there is another factor in 
nature which expresses itself in the arrangement of events and appears to us as meaning. 
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Although meaning is an anthropomorphic interpretation it nevertheless forms the indispensable 
criterion of synchronicity. What that factor which appears to us as “meaning” may be in itself we 
have no possibility of knowing. (CW8, ¶916) 
 An example of this would be, that you dreamt of a black swan that night and when you are 
walking in the morning you see a dead black swan on the side of the road and then, later on in 
the evening, you get a phone call telling you that your friend James Blackswan has suffered a 
significant heart attack. The higher the number of meaningful events in the series that happen to 
appear the less likely that there would be an apparent causal explanation for the events taking 
place. The sequence of events, as shown above, occur daily and are seemingly unconnected. It 
could be that the city that you were living in was mainly known for their swans and swan culture 
and frequently held plays depicting swans in them. There would, then, be a likely casual 
explanation for these events and therefore the sequence would not exhibit the phenomenon of 
synchronicity. What makes the sequence of events a synchronistic phenomenon is occurrence of 
the mental image with the occurrence of a series of external events which are connected by a 
similar meaning. The larger the series of events which correspond to a meaningful mental image 
the less likely a materialistic casual explanation can be given. This is because there is a 
relationship between the mental image and the external event which Jung thinks ordinary 
causality cannot explain. Synchronicity, therefore, has two factors  
a) An unconscious image comes into consciousness either directly (i.e., literally) or 
indirectly (symbolized or suggested) in the form of a dream, idea or premonition. 
b) An objective situation coincides with this content. (CW8, ¶ 858) 
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In connection to the example given above, the unconscious image came from a dream. And from 
this dream there occurred a series of events which the person ascribed meaning to. There are 
three different events which meet Jung’s  criterion for synchronicity. These are  
1. The coincidence of a psychic state in the observer with a simultaneous, objective, 
external event that corresponds to the psychic state or content… where there is no 
evidence of a causal connection between the psychic state and the external event… 
2. The coincidence of a psychic state with a corresponding (more or less simultaneous) 
external event taking place outside the observer’s field of perception, i.e., at a distance 
and only verifiable afterwards… 
3. The coincidence of a psychic state with a corresponding not yet existent future event that 
is distant in time and can likewise only be verified afterward. (CW8, ¶ 984) 
This leads us to two remaining questions. 1. What evidence gives Jung the confidence to assert 
that there are acausal phenomenon?  And 2. How is it the case that we are able to have mental 
images that occur at the same time or before an event with no ordinary casual connection? 
 To answer the first question, Jung references some experiments, one including his own, 
to bolster his theory on synchronicity. One of the main experiments is done by J.B. Rhine3 This 
controversially experiment, was critiqued by skeptics as not being able to be replicated and 
numerous instances of fabricated results. The experiment had to do with the probability of 
guessing between five different symbols drawn on a pack of twenty-five cards. The different 
symbols were a star, a square, a circle, wavy lines, and a cross. The experimenter and the subject 
were separated by a screen. The experimenter shuffles the cards using a machine and the subject 
needs to guess the symbol on the card that is being pulled up. The experimenter doesn’t know 
which order the cards are in and neither does the subject. The expected probability was five 
 
3 For the full details on this experiment I would suggest J.B. Rhine, Extra-Sensory Perception 
and New Frontiers of the Mind. For a brief overview given by Jung I would suggest his essays on 
Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle. 
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correct answers out of the twenty-five cards that were drawn. The first experiment made the 
subjects guess the cards 800 times. The average was 6.5 correct guesses. Which is 1.5 more than 
expected. The probability of such deviation is 1 : 250,000.  The results depended upon the 
subject. Some individuals had averages of 10 correct answers for 25, and one individual had 25 
correct hits per 25 which is a probability of 1 : 298,023,223,876,953,125. In another set of 
experiments the spatial distance between the experimenter and the subject was increased to 250 
miles. The average result of these were 10.1 correct guesses per 25 cards. These experiments 
were conducted several times with positive results. Further experimenting showed that time also 
had positive results which exceeded the assumed probability. The subject was to give their 
answers to future card pulling’s (CW8, ¶ 833-834). 4 Jung comments on these results that  
[t]he fact that distance has no effect in principle shows that the thing in question cannot be a 
phenomenon of force or energy, for otherwise the distance to be overcome and the diffusion in 
space would cause a diminution of the effect… Since this is obviously not the case, we have no 
alternative but to assume that distance is psychically variable, and may in certain circumstances 
be reduced to vanishing point by psychic condition… If, in the spatial experiments, we were 
obliged to admit that energy does not decrease with distance, then the time experiments make it 
completely impossible for us even to think of there being any energy relationship between the 
perception and the future event. We must give up at the outset all explanations in terms of 
energy, which amounts to saying that events of this kind cannot be considered from the point of 
view of causality, for casualty presupposes the existence of space and time in so far as all 
observations are ultimately based upon bodies in motion (CW8, ¶ 835-836). 
 
For Jung, this would be statistical proof that the concept of causality wouldn’t make 
sense because the ability to receive the information about which card is going to be pulled does 
 
4 For more references to these experiments refer to Jung’s essay on Synchronicity. This essay 
also includes his experiments on astrology. I won’t be going into the specific details of these 
experiments to save space, but anyone can check out the results there.  
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not follow from transmission of energy. If it were the case that it developed from transmission of 
energy, then space and time would affect the results of the experiment. It is, therefore, 
synchronicity which allows for these transmissions to occur, or the mental situation 
corresponding to the symbol on the card. 
The mood of the subject is also a determinant to the number of correct guesses the subject 
made. If there were a positive or excited mood about the experiment then the number of correct 
guesses would go up, if there were a decrease in mood or boredom after the first few guesses, the 
number of correct answers would decrease (CW8, ¶ 838). This would support in Jung’s mind, 
that psyche and the physical world interact in an acausal way because the mood of the subject 
affected their capacity to receive information about the symbol on the card. 
The second question that Jung needs to answer is; how is synchronicity psychologically 
possible? How is that we can have conscious images about events that are both occurring 
somewhere else from the subject and are going to occur in the future? A large part of Jung’s 
answer relies on the archetypes and his notion of space and time. Jung regards space and time as 
consisting of nothing in themselves.   
In man’s original view of the world, as we find it among primitives, space and time have a very 
precarious existence. They become “fixed” concepts only in the course of his mental 
development, thanks largely to the introduction of measurement. In themselves, space and time 
consist of nothing. They are hypostatized concepts born of the discriminating activity of the 
conscious mind, and they form the indispensable co-ordinates for describing the behaviour of 
bodies in motion. They are, therefore, essentially psychic in origin, which is probably the reason 
that impelled Kant to regard them as a priori categories (CW8, ¶ 840).  
 With this view, space and time are constructed by the measuring mind. It is through 
images in which these coincidences are made possible. It is that we have minds and that we have 
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devised means of measurements which creates the illusion that space and time are objective 
features of reality. And thus, it would seem that there is no other explanation but pure chance 
that these synchronistic events occur. But it is not pure chance because the image and the special 
temporal character are both caused by the same source; the mind. The archetypes contribute not 
only to the images but to their special temporal features.  
 Given the evidence that an image produced by the archetypes can foreshadow future 
events he assumes either that everything is mind or that there exists an objective meaning. If the 
archetypes shape the way we perceive all the way through, then, Jung  would be a subjective 
idealist and admit that the only thing that exists are the archetypes. But Jung doesn’t want to 
admit that. He says that 
[t]he great difficulty is that we have absolutely no scientific means of proving the existence of an 
objective meaning which is not just a psychic product. We are, however, driven to some such 
assumption if we are not to regress to a magical causality and ascribe to the psyche a power that 
far exceeds its empirical range of action (CW8, ¶915).  
Jung, in the final analysis, seems to commit to the idea that synchronicity is the principle 
which allows us to have access to “absolute knowledge.”  
The synchronicity principle possesses properties that may help to clear up the body-soul 
problem. Above all it is the fact of causeless order, or rather, of meaningful orderedness, that 
may throw light on psychophysical parallelism. The “absolute knowledge” which is 
characteristic of synchronistic phenomena, a knowledge not mediated by the sense organs, 
supports the hypothesis of a self-subsistent meaning, or even expresses its existence. Such a form 
of existence can only be transcendental, since, as the knowledge of future or spatially distant 
events shows, it is contained in a psychically relative space and time, that is to say in an 
irrepresentable space-time continuum (CW8, ¶ 948). 
 Jung thinks that the archetypes are similar to the Kantian categories of space and time. 
There is no objective spatial-temporal order for Jung but, instead, the mind imposes space and 
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time onto the external world and are considered by Jung to be transcendental in the Kantian 
sense of the word. What this means is that the archetypes are the necessary conditions for the 
possibility of experience. Synchronicity, then, is the mediating force between mind and body 
which allows us to have access to objects as they are outside of sense perception.  
  Jung’s theory of synchronicity plays with the exciting idea of another principle 
complementary to causality, an organizing principle which allows internal images to correspond 
to external events in a meaningful way. Though there seem to be reports about pre-cognition, the 
empirical evidence confirming them is entirely lacking. That is why Jung is cautious about this 
theory and waited as long as he did before he published Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting 
Principle. The claims he makes suppose that there is some “thing” which construes events in a 
meaningful way, and we can have no direct access to this knowledge but can only suppose it 
exits from meaningful chanced happenings. It is “transcendental” as Jung uses the term and the 
experiments used to test this phenomenon are so far insufficient for supporting a transcendental 
principle such as synchronicity. 
  Jung only gave a full explanation of Synchronicity towards the end of his life in 1952.  
Jung got along fine without referencing synchronicity before this and felt that it deserved a 
proper explanation because of coincidences he happened to observe in his personal life, 
discussions with the physicist Wolfgang Pauli, clinical studies, and the Rhine experiment. To 
explain these coincidences, he needed to theorize some principle which would allow 
synchronicity events to be something other than chanced occurrences. To the extent that Jung 
requires us to solve the mind body problem becomes irrelevant, so long as we understand the 
states of the collective unconscious as states of a certain functional system; the mind. 
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FUNCTIONALISM 
In this section, I will present the theory of functionalism about mental states in order to 
show that it is plausible that the collective unconscious is comprised of cognitive states of the 
central nervous system, as the functionalist understands them.   
Very roughly, a functionalist theory (of whatever phenomenon) posits that a thing 
essentially is what it is because of what it does. This is (equally roughly) what functionalism in 
the philosophy of psychology and metaphysics of mind says about mental states. According to 
functionalism a state is a mental state of type M  just in case it plays the roles characteristically 
played by M-states. Functionalism became popular in the early second half of the 20th century in 
response to the mind-body problem and radical behaviorism.  The two early pioneers of this 
theory were Hilary Putnam (1967) and David Armstrong (1981 )  and to exemplify what 
functionalism is I will use the example of a basic thermometer. Take a simple machine which 
can only display two colors; red and blue. The machine says red when the temperature of the 
room is above 70 degrees and shows blue when the temperature is below 70. When the 
temperature reaches above 70 degrees the machine switches into mode 1 and displays red. When 
the temperature is below 70 degrees the machine switches into mode 2 and shows the blue light. 
We can say, then, that mode 1 is constituted by when the machine senses that the temperature is 
above 70 degrees and displays a red light. Similarly, mode 2 is constituted by the machine 
sensing when the temperature is below 70 degrees and shows a blue light.  
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Putnam and Fodor would view this example as analogies to mental states in a version of 
functionalism known as machine state functionalism. Mental states, for Putnam and Fodor, can 
be defined based on similar methods for defining the mode 1 and mode 2 of the simple machine 
above. That is, mental states are constituted of their casual roles in a cognitive system, i.e., their 
relation to other mental states and inputs and outputs.  
Another important feature of functionalism is that mental states can be realized by states 
with very different physical properties (Block, 1996).5 What this means is that both mode 1 and 
mode 2 of the thermometer could consist of either analog or digital properties. For example, the 
 
5 Can be realized also by non-physical properties  
Mode 2 Mode 1 
Above 70⁰ Below 70⁰ 
“Red ” “Blue” 
Figure 1 
Functionalist Model 
of Mode 1 and Mode  
2 
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analog thermometers use mercury in a glass chamber. When placed inside the object, the 
mercury either heats up or cools down to the proper temperature reading (THERMOPRO, 2019). 
The digital thermometer, on the other hand, uses the expansion of metal and electrical circuits to 
read temperature when placed inside an object (THERMOPRO, 2019). The material which 
makes up the thermometer is ignored and instead the focus on what is a thermometer is based on 
the casual roles of the system, i.e., placing the thermometer inside an object and getting an output 
of either a red light or a blue light depending on the temperature reading.  
Functionalism defines what something is based on its function and does so by describing 
the inputs and outputs characteristic of that thing. Mental states for the functionalist are the 
inputs and outputs characteristic for those mental states. Take a basic belief of there being a cup 
on the table. The belief that there is a cup on the table is formed by a variety of internal and 
external processes. For functionalism what a mental state is, like the belief of their being a cup 
on the table, are the casual roles and the mental state. For example, imagine walking into a room 
and there being a cup on the table. The initial input would be the external perception of the cup. 
This external input is converted into internal neural inputs. These internal neural inputs cause the 
belief that there is a cup on the table. This, then, leads to internal neural outputs which cause an 
external output of, for example, grabbing the cup or smashing the cup. What makes up the belief 
of there being a cup on the table, for the functionalist, are all of these characteristic inputs, 
outputs, and their casual relationship to the mental state. 
Functionalism emerged as a response to behaviorism and its rejection of internal states of 
mind. The behaviorist believed that we shouldn’t talk about the mental states if mental states 
weren’t required for predicting behavior. Behaviorism logged many a priori and a posterior 
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objection to mental states.  Therefore, behavioral psychologist would focus only on the 
“observable stimulus-response behavior,” (McLeod, 2017) and ignore internal mental states, e.g., 
thoughts, beliefs, and desires as internal mental states. The typical psychological picture is of the  
“form E → M → R” (Flanagan, 1991, p. 93), where E is an environmental condition, M is a 
mental state, and R is the response. Skinner, the most prominent behavioral psychologist, 
believed that if the observable data didn’t support mental states, then we wouldn’t have the need 
to talk about them. This reduces the “typical psychological casual chain from E → M → R, to 
E→ R” (Flanagan,1991,p.94).  
Flanagan present many common objections to the model that Skinner presents (1991, 
p.95).  
1. Skinner assumes the purpose of science is prediction, whereas the cognitive 
psychologist may believe the purpose of psychology is to give an account of these 
neurological and mental states that explains as well as predicts.  
2. Skinner assumes that the casual sequence above begins in the environment, whereas it 
could possibly begin in the mind, or mental states causing other mental states to result 
in a response. 
3. Skinner gives an unrestricted conception of explanation. He thinks any cause can 
explain an event. He assumes that a single cause is sufficient for a scientific 
explanation when this isn’t necessarily the case. Some explanations require further 
causes, while Skinner thinks that showing one cause is sufficient.  Take two examples 
of explaining why a girl may be thirsty. First; the girl is thirsty because it is hot. The 
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second; the girl is thirsty because it is hot outside and she just came from a run. The 
second explanation is more sufficient than the first.   
The behaviorist, or Skinner’s psychology, fails to provide an adequate account of human 
behavior precisely because it eliminates internal mental states. The functionalist gives a way of 
restoring mental states to psychological explanation while still being able to maintain 
materialism.  
To show how this can be so Ian Ravenscroft (2005) gives the following example. Say that 
the tallest person in the room is identical to Sally, and that Sally is identical to the smartest 
person in the room. Then by the transitivity of identity we can conclude that the tallest person in 
the room is identical to the smartest person in the room (Ravenscroft,2005) 
He expresses this principle as  
1. A = B  
2. B = C 
Therefore,  
3. A = C 
Ravenscroft (2005) uses this application of identity relations to show how functional role 
realizers can be identical to physical states. He exemplifies how functional mental states can be 
physical with reference to pain. He says that if we assume that the occupant of the pain role is 
equal to R and R is equal to some neural state. Therefore, 
1. Pain = R 
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2. R = neural states  
Therefore, 
3. Pain = Some neural state (Ravenscroft, 2005) 
This means that mental states and brain states can be identical. In describing the inputs 
and outputs of the system, we do not need to talk about what the brain states or mental states are 
made  of. Therefore, it wouldn’t matter whether or not we are talking about specific neural 
activity, but what would matter is the casual relationship which is characteristic of the mental 
role, it and the interaction between other mental states.  
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 FUNCTIONALISM AND JUNG  
In this section, I will create a general functionalist view of instincts and archetypes as 
they are presented in the later version of Jung. In doing this, I will show how three of the four 
features of the collective unconscious do not raise any issues of spiritualism. The reason for why 
is because functionalism can be viewed as a materialism. The issue of how we can have 
archetypes that are present in everyone is resolved because mental contents are also materialistic 
under functionalism. This means that the explanation for why we have archetypes is because of 
evolution and how the archetypes work must also, then, be due to biochemical processes.  By 
viewing the collective unconscious through the lens of functionalism, Jung doesn’t need to rely 
on spiritualism to explain how mental systems can interact with the body.  
   To map on the functionalist theory onto the Jungian theory of the collective unconscious. 
I will use the example of fear. Fear, in principle for the functionalist, can cause a variety of 
inputs and outputs, but not everything that causes fear or is caused by fear is characteristic of the 
mental state. In the functional model, all of the relata are characteristic except for the mental 
state itself, i.e., the casual inputs and outputs. The functionalist model of fear begins with the 
inputs. These inputs can vary from being alone in the dark to seeing a bear in the woods, but one 
of the things which leads to being in fear is the perception of some event which usually causes 
fear in a person. The external input then leads to internal inputs in the form of neural activity. 
The neural activity causes the person to think fear like thoughts and this will cause the person to 
be in fear. The fear in the individual will produce internal outputs and external behavior of fear. 
The internal outputs are neural activity occurring and this neural activity will produce an external 
behavior to fear, e.g., running away.   
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Figure 2 Basic Functional Model of Fear 
I will be expanding on this very basic model to help show how the Jungian collective 
unconscious can be integrated into the functionalist picture of the mind. As a reminder, the 
collective unconscious consists of archetypes and instincts. The archetypes are the blueprints 
which give the archetypal images their form, and the instincts are reactions that are not 
personally acquired but collective. The instincts easily fit into the model that we’ve built above. 
Instincts are the inherited uniform reaction people have. For the functional model, I will use the 
example of an encounter with a snake. Snakes are notorious for producing fear when seen. To 
add on to the model that’s already been built, we can say that when someone sees a snake, there 
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is an internal input of stimulation in neural activity which activates an instinct or instincts. The 
instincts’ activation produces characteristic internal outputs of those instincts, e.g., triggers 
neurons to fire, which usually cause the external behavior characteristic of those instincts, e.g., 
running or screaming and the belief that you are in danger. In the case of instincts, the reaction 
occurs before the belief. It is only after or at the same time of the perception of danger that you 
become aware that you are being threatened.  
 
Figure 3 Basic Functional Model of an Instinct 
    The archetypes and the archetypal images present a greater complexity to the model above. 
Just as the instincts activate when an instinctual experience is perceived and produces 
unconscious impulses to react, the archetypes also activates when a characteristic situation is 
perceived. When this occurs, archetypes produce archetypal images in consciousness. This, in 
turn, produces characteristic beliefs in the person, and these beliefs produce internal neural 
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outputs which motivate the person to a characteristic action. To turn back to the snake example, 
instead of an instinctual response to unconscious impulses, we could say that when the person 
typically sees a snake, the external perception of the object sends internal neural responses via., 
neurons, to the proper neural configuration which makes up the archetypes . If the neurons firing 
activates the archetypes, they will produce archetypal images.6 These internal images could be a  
voice in the mind telling the person to run or a vivid apparition of the devil which causes the 
characteristic belief that they are being threatened. The external input of the perception of the 
snake with the internal input of neurons fire lead to the archetypes’ internal outputs of archetypal 
images, which lead to the internal outputs of neurons firing, which will then cause the external 
behavior of screaming and running, which are characteristic of an archetypal situation.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 There are issues with physicalism about mental imagery. There is a metaphysical mystery about 
how felt content can be functional. This is an issue for physicalism but is not a special problem 
for functionalism.  
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Figure 4 Functional Model of an Archetype 
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CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have discussed four features of the collective unconscious that may pose issues 
for Jung’s theory.  
1.) The collectivity of the collective unconscious 
 2.) The possibility of pre-existent contents within the mind namely, instincts and 
archetypes 
3.) Psychic energy 
4.) Synchronicity 
Three of these features I have shown to be plausible explanations for the contents of the 
mind. The first feature was the collectivity of the collective unconscious. In the initial exposition 
of this paper on Jung, I gave six examples of a single archetypal image. Three of the examples 
are dreams and three are pictures. The pictures and the dreams support the claim that there are 
structures in the mind, archetypes, which are collective. It would be difficult to assume that the 
connection between these similar images had to do with the migration of a group of people. Even 
if we make the leap and assume the Tibetan monks were in contact with the Navaho Indians, it 
still doesn’t answer the question of the mandala symbol appearing in dreams. It would be a more 
compelling assumption to assume the existence of archetypes which produce these images. This 
would explain how the symbol of the mandala could emerge in these two separate cultures.  
 The second feature of the collective unconscious that was covered in this thesis, is the 
possibility of inherited cognitive structures of the mind. I have compared the archetypes and the 
instincts to contemporary theories of evolution and linguistic theories which, if credible, would 
51 
 
also have to make, at least partially, Jung’s theory credible.  It would be absurd to assume that 
the mind is the only organ which doesn’t undergo evolutionary changes. To assume that we can 
pass on the formal structures of our mind shouldn’t raise criticisms of spirituality. Jung doesn’t 
say that ideas and memories are inherited, but that the formal elements of ideas and images are. 
The archetypes are similar to the structures Chomsky refers to when he speaks about language 
acquisition. It isn’t that the rules of grammar are inherited, but the structures which make 
grammar possible are. It seems possible, then, that the archetypes are inherited structures present 
in the mind.  
 The third feature of the collective unconscious is synchronicity. Synchronicity was Jung’s 
way of dealing with the interaction of the mind and body. In this thesis, I didn’t defend Jung’s 
conception of synchronicity because it implies more than what is necessary to explain how the 
mind and body interact. Synchronicity implies something complementary to causality which 
orders events in a meaningful way. The data that Jung presents for this phenomenon is lacking. If 
he is going to posit a force complementary to causality, there would need to be more concrete 
evidence which is currently not available.  But despite of these issues, I have shown that Jung 
doesn’t need to assume the existence of this complementary force, because of functionalism. If 
we assume that the contents of the collective unconscious are functional systems, then we 
wouldn’t need to talk about how it is that the mind and body interact. This is because 
functionalism is a materialist theory which states that something is its function. By defining the 
archetypes in functional terms, the mind-body problem goes away.  
 In viewing the Jungian collective unconscious as containing functionalist structures, I’ve 
shown that the issues of synchronicity do not threaten Jung’s theory overall.  The collective 
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unconscious should be viewed as an adequate theory of the contents of the mind. The radical 
claims of spiritualism have led many to unjustly ignore psychological and philosophical works of 
Jung. I hope, in the future, more attention will be given to the theories of Carl Jung.  
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